G10: Louisiana 24, App. State 21

[DieHard 1280]

Napier explained the decisions on the final drive in the conversation he had on the Great Scott show this morning. He said the 3rd down play was an example of an opportunity to improve coaching. I took it as his way of saying that Levi probably shouldn't have thrown the ball without actually throwing him under the bus.

https://forumeus.com/showthread.php/...pier-(12-7-20)

[covcaj]

Napier explained the decisions on the final drive in the conversation he had on the Great Scott show this morning. He said the 3rd down play was an example of an opportunity to improve coaching. I took it as his way of saying that Levi probably shouldn't have thrown the ball without actually throwing him under the bus.

https://forumeus.com/showthread.php/...pier-(12-7-20)

Or maybe he was saying that it was on him to have made the wrong call and he needed to improve his coaching. (decisions).

[Turbine]

Napier explained the decisions on the final drive in the conversation he had on the Great Scott show this morning. He said the 3rd down play was an example of an opportunity to improve coaching. I took it as his way of saying that Levi probably shouldn't have thrown the ball without actually throwing him under the bus.

https://forumeus.com/showthread.php/...pier-(12-7-20)

I took the exchange as meaning we "play to win" thus the pass play on third, but that they could have done a better job of situational coaching ... sort of "If this then that"

[SlickRick]

This was the pass that followed his 30 yard scramble run on first down.

His underthrowing a wide open Erroll Rogers deep downfield is directly related to tiredness after running the ball.

Plus the ball was heavier than normal.

jmo

Not just heavier, it was cold and windy. It doesn't get any worse to spin it.

[fanof71]

And App had the play covered. On ball, play was similar to the first TD Regas scored. At this point, as a not so great person once said, what does it matter...

[zephyr]

This game thread was entertaining to say the least. It had everything, ebbs and flows, overreaction and even had BWK talking people off the proverbial ledge. It was great.

[Gueydanmike1969]

I know that I enjoy the heck out of participating on Ragin Pagin when I can't make it to the game. It truly is the "next best thing to being there."

[GoneGolfin]

GG,

I always enjoy your analyses, they reflect a serious consideration of a lot of variables.

Some years back, it occurred to me that it might be advantageous to deliberately take a safety, in order to flip the field. About 3 weeks after that occurred to me, dang if Spurrier didn't do exactly that late in a game at UF, and just trust in his D to get them through. I don't remember who he was playing, but the 'Gators ended up winning the game.

So I will say that however much we might criticize this or that, Napier's decision to take a safety was *very* original thinking, maybe even more original than Spurrier's: it never occurred to me to intentionally take a safety to remove some uncertainty from a game. Being able to modify a highly stochastic situation is one of those critical considerations that doesn't often come up in basic game theory. Removing uncertainty has a value, although it can be really hard to calculate that value, because the uncertainty itself is hard to estimate.

So all other considerations aside, what I like in this is that Napier is no dumb jock.

I'll always be enthusiastic about a coach who is thinking about problems in innovative and unorthodox ways. Napier is that guy.

Thanks, Fun. It would have been interesting to see a prediction model at that point of the game (probability of winning given several options on 4th and 2). The problem is that there is no real training data to support the learning of such a model. Removing that uncertainty, as you said, does have value. And there likely still is not enough data in all of football to properly model the outcomes.

I fully agree with your point about appreciating a coach that has the ability to evaluate situations, especially critical ones, with innovation. And it is often the case that such innovation is initially ridiculed ... until the masses have had a chance to "catch up" in their thinking and challenge their own biases and presets.

Brian

[Turbine]

I have not seen the ESPN article ... and I still do not think I would have made the same choice ... but I certainly understand the choice and was not shocked by the decision Napier made. What I discussed with my wife at the time ...

1) Obviously everyone was uncomfortable with punting the ball and my thought going into the Cajuns' last offensive series was that they needed to play for a first down to win. I and many others would have run the football on that 3rd and 2 ... especially when the defensive alignment on that 3rd and 2 was was achievable for the Cajuns (was not an 8 in the box alignment). If you come up just short, you challenge your conference best OL and RBs to win the game on 4th down.

2) This did not happen and we go back to the fact that nobody was comfortable punting the ball in that situation. Now, to take a safety on a 4th and 2 from your own 35 is one of the most unconventional things I have seen. But if Napier had come to the conclusion that he cannot risk attempting a punt, you are either going for it or taking the safety.

** Another hybrid option I would consider is ... line up to attempt the punt. If the snap is clean, you punt away. If not, the punter is mentally ready to chase the ball down and attempt to ensure a safety (scooping and running ... or kicking it out of the end zone). Being mentally ready is an advantage in that an over-snap is always a surprise to the punter. In this case, it would not be a surprise (unfortunately for the Cajuns in this game) and the course of action would have been thought-through beforehand. Still some risk here, to be certain. But another option. A variation of this would be to put one of the blockers back behind the punter to increase the probability of success in an over-snap situation.

3) The FG kicking conditions (everything from the snap, hold, to kick) were perilous. Had they not been so perilous, I do not think Napier would have allowed the lead to be cut to three points in that situation. But I think that this situation was different and some unconventional thinking was reasonable. But I think another important aspect in favor of Napier's decision was ...

4) When a team is down by four or more points and it is TD or bust, it changes the mindset of the trailing team. They are more aggressive in their approach. Conversely, when a team is down by three, they are more conservative in their approach ... especially once they are in FG range. The approach is not to make a mistake and sure that at minimum they get to a FG attempt. Add in that the FG kicking conditions were perilous, this adds to the probability that the Cajuns escape with a win. I am not convinced the Cajuns make it out of Boone with a win had App State been down by five and forced to put it in the end zone. App State would have had a different mindset.

5) The context of the situation/game was unique and we may never see such a context for a decision like this ever again. I do credit Napier for some out of the box thinking that was sure to draw significant criticism (even with eventual success), especially at the outset before people had a chance to truly digest all of the variables.

As a post-script ... the App State kicker was kicking the ball low all night. I thought the Cajuns had a block earlier in the game on the 43-yarder (just missed). He obviously missed the short FG earlier in the first half. On that final FG attempt, it was also low and I felt that if the kick would have been online, the ball would have intercepted a legion of Cajun hands resulting in a block. I am not convinced that the Cajuns still did not get a finger on the kick that was left.

Brian

Great insight

[Boomer]

Thanks, Fun. It would have been interesting to see a prediction model at that point of the game (probability of winning given several options on 4th and 2). The problem is that there is no real training data to support the learning of such a model. Removing that uncertainty, as you said, does have value. And there likely still is not enough data in all of football to properly model the outcomes.

I fully agree with your point about appreciating a coach that has the ability to evaluate situations, especially critical ones, with innovation. And it is often the case that such innovation is initially ridiculed ... until the masses have had a chance to "catch up" in their thinking and challenge their own biases and presets.

Brian

.....WELL NOT OFTEN that a coach puts the wrong call on himself.....but the correct calls were a run of some kind that the chart showed on 3rd and 2.....if a 4th down occurs a quick kick is ideal with short yardage and the first down to decide the game! App coach mentioned the punt, safety, or quick kick if not a normal play call!